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Abstract—Automatically detecting software vulnerabilities is an important problem that has attracted much attention. However, existing
vulnerability detectors still cannot achieve the vulnerability detection capability and locating precision that would warrant their adoption
for real-world use. In this paper, we present Vulnerability Deep learning-based Locator (VulDeeLocator), a deep learning-based
fine-grained vulnerability detector, for C programs with source code. VulDeeLocator advances the state-of-the-art by simultaneously
achieving a high detection capability and a high locating precision. When applied to three real-world software products, VulDeeLocator
detects four vulnerabilities that are not reported in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD); among these four vulnerabilities, three
are not known to exist in these products until now, but the other one has been “silently” patched by the vendor when releasing newer
versions of the vulnerable product. The core innovations underlying VulDeeLocator are (i) the leverage of intermediate code to
accommodate semantic information that cannot be conveyed by source code-based representations, and (ii) the concept of granularity
refinement for precisely pinning down locations of vulnerabilities.
Index Terms—Vulnerability detection, security, deep learning, program analysis, program representation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
SOFTWARE vulnerabilities are a major cause of cyberattacks. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities are prevalent as
evidenced by the steady increase of vulnerabilities reported
by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [1].
One important approach towards eliminating vulnerabili-
ties is to design vulnerability detectors to detect (and patch)
them. An ideal vulnerability detector should simultaneously
achieve a high detection capability and a high locating precision
(i.e., precisely pinning down the vulnerable lines of code).
A popular family of vulnerability detectors is based
on static analysis. These detectors can be divided into code
similarity-based ones and pattern-based ones. Code similarity-
based detectors [2], [3], [4], [5] can detect vulnerabilities
caused by code cloning, and can achieve a high locating
precision when they indeed detect vulnerabilities. How-
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ever, they incur high false-negatives (i.e., low detection
capability) when applied to detect vulnerabilities that are
not caused by code cloning. Pattern-based detectors can be
further divided into rule-based ones and machine learning-
based ones. Rule-based detectors [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] can
identify the vulnerable lines of code when they indeed cor-
rectly detect vulnerabilities, but often incur a low detection
capability (because of their high false-positives and high
false-negatives). Moreover, they require human analysts to
define vulnerability detection rules. Machine learning-based
detectors use vulnerability patterns for detection, where the
patterns are learned from analyst-defined feature represen-
tation of vulnerable programs [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. How-
ever, these detectors cannot achieve a high locating precision
because they operate at a coarse granularity, typically at the
function level [12].
The recent development in machine learning-based vul-
nerability detection is to use deep learning [17], [18] and
operate at a finer, or “program slice”, level. These detectors
also can relieve the problem of manual-feature definition,
which has received further attention recently [19], [20],
[21]. However, these detectors still offer inadequate detection
capability and inadequate locating precision.
To see their inadequate detection capability, we observe that
the state-of-the-art detector [18], despite its improvement
upon [17], reportedly achieves an F1-measure of 86.0%, a
false-positive rate of 10.1%, and a false-negative rate of
12.2% (see Table 4 in Section 6). This inadequacy can be
attributed to the detector’s incapability in (i) capturing the
relations between semantically-related statements and (ii)
taking advantage of control flows and the variable define-
use relations. To see (i), we observe that programs often
contain many user-defined and/or system header files (e.g.,
.h) for defining types and macros. Analyzing source code
alone, as is done in [17], [18], cannot associate the uses
of types and macros in program files (e.g., .c) to their
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2definitions in header files. This is not surprising because
source code analysis tools may not even be able to correctly
identify the relations between the definition and the use
of macros and global variables in a same program file, as
what will be shown in Section 6.6. To see (ii), we observe
that source code is not in the Static Single Assignment
(SSA) form, which assures that each variable is defined-and-
then-used and is assigned exactly once [22]. That is, source
code-based representations do not fully expose control flows
and/or variable define-use relations [23], and some semantic
information cannot be captured by vulnerability detectors
that leverage source code-based representations [17], [18].
To see their inadequate locating precision, we observe that
although they operate on program slices (which are finer-
grained than functions), a program slice can have many
lines of code. For example, according to the dataset pub-
lished in [18], 78.7% of their program slices have at least
10 lines of code and 47.8% of them have at least 20 lines,
indicating a low locating precision. That is, coarse-grained
vulnerability detection is merely a pre-step for vulnerability
assessment because it cannot precisely pinpoint vulnerabil-
ities [24].
The preceding inadequacies of state-of-the-art vulnera-
bility detectors motivates the need of detectors that can
achieve a high detection capability and a high locating
precision simultaneously.
Our contributions. In this paper we make two contri-
butions. First, we propose Vulnerability Deep learning-
based Locator (VulDeeLocator), a deep learning-based fine-
grained vulnerability detector, for C programs with source
code. VulDeeLocator can simultaneously achieve a high de-
tection capability and a high locating precision. When com-
pared with the state-of-the-art detector [18], VulDeeLocator
offers (i) an 11.0%, 9.6%, and 8.2% improvement in the
vulnerability detection F1-measure, false-positive rate, and
false-negative rate, respectively; and (ii) a 3.9X improvement
in the vulnerability locating precision. When applied to
three real-world software products, it detects four vulner-
abilities that are not reported in the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [25]. Among these four vulnerabilities,
three are not known to exist in these products until now
and have been notified to the vendors, and the other one
has been “silently” patched by the vendor when releasing
newer versions of the vulnerable product. VulDeeLocator
has two innovations:
• It leverages program intermediate code to define pro-
gram slices for vulnerability detection. Such slices
can accommodate semantic information that cannot
be conveyed by source code-based representations,
such as the aforementioned (i) relations between the
definitions of types and macros and their uses and
(ii) control flows and variable define-use relations.
• It leverages the idea of granularity refinement intro-
duced in this paper to make the granularity of de-
tector outputs (e.g., 3 lines of code) finer than the
granularity of detector inputs (e.g., 32 lines of code).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use interme-
diate code to design machine learning-based vulnerability
detectors, despite that intermediate code has been leveraged
in rule-based vulnerability detectors [8], [9]. Moreover, we
introduce new guiding principles for vulnerability candi-
date representations and new requirements for fine-grained
vulnerability detectors. These guiding principles and re-
quirements would guide the design of tailored fine-grained
vulnerability detectors. We demonstrate the feasibility of
granularity refinement via a novel variant of the Bidirec-
tional Recurrent Neural Network (BRNN), dubbed “BRNN
for vulnerability detection and locating” (BRNN-vdl).
Second, we prepare a dataset in the Lower Level Virtual
Machine (LLVM) intermediate code with accompanying
program source code. This dataset is motivated by the
need of evaluating the effectiveness of VulDeeLocator; it
contains 119,782 vulnerability candidates in intermediate
code, among which 30,201 are vulnerable and 89,581 are not
vulnerable. It is not trivial to prepare this dataset because
we need user-defined and system header files for generating
intermediate code. In order for other researchers to use the
dataset, we have made it available at https://github.com/
VulDeeLocator/VulDeeLocator. We will publish the source
code used in our experiments on the same website.
Paper organization. Section 2 discusses the basic ideas and
definitions underlying VulDeeLocator. Section 3 presents
an overview of VulDeeLocator. Section 4 describes how
VulDeeLocator leverages intermediate code and Section 5
describes how VulDeeLocator pinpoints vulnerabilities. Sec-
tion 6 presents our experiments and results. Section 7 dis-
cusses limitations of the present study. Section 8 reviews the
related prior work. Section 9 concludes the present paper.
2 BASIC IDEAS AND DEFINITIONS
2.1 Basic Ideas
The basic idea underlying VulDeeLocator is to extract some
tokens (e.g., identifiers, operators, constants, and keywords)
from program source code according to a given set of
vulnerability syntax characteristics, and then leverage the
intermediate code of the same program to accommodate the
statements in the intermediate code that are semantically
related to those tokens. These statements are encoded into
vectors (which are then used to train a neural network) or
are the input to the trained neural network for vulnerability
detection. The output in the testing phase is finer-grained
(i.e., shorter or smaller) than the corresponding input. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates these basic ideas, showing that in the testing
phase an input of d′ intermediate code statements leads to
a refined output of two source code statements indicating
where the vulnerability is.
sc1  -------
sc2  -------
sc3  -------
   ...
Source code
Vulnerability 
syntax 
characteristics
ic1 ------- 
ic2 -------
ic3 -------
ic4 -------
ic5 -------
    ...
Intermediate code
sc2 -------
    ...
ic1'  -------
    ...
icd'  -------
Intermediate code 
statements of interest
Vectors
Neural 
network
sc3 -------
sc4 -------
Output of 
refined 
granularity 
indicating 
exactly where 
a vulnerability 
is located
Tokens of interest
Tokens
Fig. 1. Illustration of VulDeeLocator, where a dashed line represents a
statement containing multiple tokens.
3The idea of leveraging intermediate code deserves more
explanation. Figure 2 describes a buffer overflow vulnera-
bility candidate related to pointer “data” (Line 2). However,
the candidate cannot accommodate the control flow of con-
ditional operator “N<m?N:99” (Line 14), despite that this
kind of semantic information is important for vulnerability
detection (because control flow can expose vulnerabilities
[26]). Source code-based representations cannot convey this
kind of semantic information because source code is not in
the SSA form [22], which assures that each variable is as-
signed exactly once. These limitations of source code-based
representations can be overcome by intermediate code.
 Source program
A source code-based 
vulnerability candidate related 
to  “data”  (Line 2)
1  #define N 100
2  char *data;
3  void printLine()
4  {
5      if(data != "") 
6           printf("%s\n", data);
7   }
8  int main()
9  {
10   char dataBuffer[N];
11   char source[N];
12   int m=99;
13   .. .
14   memset(dataBuffer, 'A', N<m?N:99);
15   dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
16   .. .
17   while(dataBuffer  != "")
18   {
19        data = dataBuffer  - 8;
20        break;
21    }
22   .. .
23   memset(source, 'C', 99); 
24   source[99] = '\0'; 
25   memmove(data, source, N*sizeof(char));
26   data[99] = '\0';
27   printLine();
28   return 0;
29 }
2     char *data;
8     int main()
10   char dataBuffer[N];
11   char source[N];
12   int m=99;
14   memset(dataBuffer, 'A', N<m?N:99);
15   dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
17   while(dataBuffer != "")
19   data = dataBuffer - 8;
23   memset(source, 'C', 99); 
24   source[99] = '\0'; 
25   memmove(data, source, N*sizeof(char));
26   data[99] = '\0';
27   printLine();
3     void printLine()
5     if(data != "") 
6     printf("%s\n", data);
Fig. 2. An example showing that source code-based representation
cannot fully expose the semantic information corresponding to “data”
(Line 2 in the source program) that may be related to a vulnerability.
Figure 2 also shows another example, where the macro
definition identifier “N” (highlighted with boxes) cannot be
identified as “100” when using source code-based represen-
tation to derive the vulnerability candidate related to “data”.
This is because source code parsing may not associate the
use of macros and global variables to their definitions in
the same program file, let alone associating the use of types
and macros in a program file (e.g., .c) to their definitions in
another file (i.e., header file). As we will see later, this kind
of semantic information can be captured by intermediate
code.
2.2 Formal Definitions
In order to make the aforementioned ideas precise, we need
formal definitions. We start with reviewing:
Definition 1 (source program). A source program P is a set of
program files p1, . . . , pn, denoted by P = {p1, . . . , pn}.
A program file pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) consists of a set of
functions and possibly some outside type and/or macro
definitions (i.e., these type and/or macro definitions are
not specified inside, but are specified outside, those func-
tions). We denote these functions and outside type and
macro definitions by fi,1, . . . , fi,mi and therefore denote
a program file by pi = {fi,1, . . . , fi,mi}. A function or
outside type and/or macro definition fi,j (1 ≤ j ≤ mi)
is a sequence of statements si,j,1, . . . , si,j,ri,j , denoted
by fi,j = (si,j,1, . . . , si,j,ri,j ). A statement si,j,k (1 ≤
k ≤ ri,j) is a sequence of tokens, denoted by si,j,k =
(ti,j,k,1, . . . , ti,j,k,ξi,j,k), where ti,j,k,l (1 ≤ l ≤ ξi,j,k) is a
token (e.g., identifier, operator, constant, and keyword).
It is intuitive that vulnerabilities exhibit some syntax
characteristics that can be leveraged to identify some pieces
of code (i.e., program slices) as initial candidates for vulnera-
bility detection [17], [18]. Vulnerability syntax characteristics
can be represented via some appropriate data structures
(e.g., Abstract Syntax Trees or ASTs), which allow one to
extract pieces of source code that match these characteristics.
Regardless of the representation of such characteristics, we
can use H = {h1, ..., hη} to represent a set of η vulnera-
bility syntax characteristics. We can use a characteristic hq
(1 ≤ q ≤ η) to extract pieces of source code as syntax-based
vulnerability candidates, which are the starting point for
vulnerability detection, leading to:
Definition 2. (source code- and Syntax-based Vulnerability
Candidate or sSyVC [18]) Consider a source pro-
gram P = {p1, . . . , pn} where a program file pi =
{fi,1, . . . , fi,mi}, a function or outside type and/or
macro definition fi,j =
{
si,j,1, . . . , si,j,ri,j
}
, and a state-
ment si,j,k = (ti,j,k,1, . . . , ti,j,k,ξi,j,k,z ). Given a set of
vulnerability syntax characteristics H = {h1, . . . , hη},
a sSyVC yi,j,k,z is one or multiple consecutive tokens
in statement si,j,k that match some vulnerability syntax
characteristic hq (1 ≤ q ≤ η), denoted by yi,j,k,z =
(ti,j,k,u, . . . , ti,j,k,v) where 1 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ ξi,j,k,z .
Since we propose leveraging program intermediate code
to capture semantic information, we need to define:
Definition 3 (intermediate code). Given a source pro-
gram P = {p1, . . . , pn} where program file pi =
{fi,1, . . . , fi,mi}, the intermediate code of source program
P , denoted by P ′, is a set of intermediate program
files denoted by P ′ = {p′1, . . . , p′n}, where p′i is the
intermediate code of program file pi and correspond-
ingly consists of a set of functions and possibly some
outside type and/or macro definitions (i.e., these type
and/or macro definitions are not specified within, but
are specified outside, those functions in intermediate-
code program file p′i), denoted by f
′
i,1, . . . , f
′
i,mi
. We de-
note by p′i =
{
f ′i,1, . . . , f
′
i,mi
}
, where f ′i,j (1 ≤ j ≤ mi)
is the intermediate code of a function or outside type
and/or macro definition fi,j , denoted by a sequence of
statements f ′i,j = (s
′
i,j,1, . . . , s
′
i,j,r′i,j
).
Given sSyVCs extracted from a program and the inter-
mediate code of the same program, we can now define:
Definition 4. (intermediate code- and Semantics-based Vul-
nerability Candidate or iSeVC) Consider a source pro-
gram P = {p1, . . . , pn}, its intermediate code P ′ =
{p′1, . . . , p′n}, and a sSyVC yi,j,k,z of P . Denote by y′i,j,k,z
the intermediate code of sSyVC yi,j,k,z in p′i. The iSeVC
corresponding to sSyVC yi,j,k,z is a sequence of state-
ments s′a1,b1,c1 , . . . , s
′
aρi,j,k,z ,bψi,j,k,z ,c$i,j,k,z
in interme-
diate code P ′ of source program P ; these statements are
data or control dependent [27] on y′i,j,k,z , denoted by
ei,j,k,z = (s
′
a1,b1,c1
, . . . , s′aρi,j,k,z ,bψi,j,k,z ,c$i,j,k,z ). That is,
the iSeVC corresponding to sSyVC yi,j,k,z is a program
slice of y′i,j,k,z in the intermediate code of program P .
43 OVERVIEW OF VULDEELOCATOR
Figure 3 highlights the structure of VulDeeLocator, which
can be instantiated with specific intermediate code repre-
sentations and deep learning models. The input to VulDee-
Locator is the source code of training programs for learning
a neural network or target programs for vulnerability de-
tection. More specifically, the learning-phase input includes
source code of C programs, which may or may not be
vulnerable. The source code of C programs should satisfy
the following: (i) they can be compiled into (platform-
independent) intermediate code, such as the LLVM inter-
mediate code [28], [22]; and (ii) the vulnerable programs are
accompanied by descriptions on the locations of their vul-
nerabilities, which will be leveraged to locate vulnerabilities
in target programs.
At a high level, VulDeeLocator has two components. The
first component leverages intermediate code representation
of training programs and target programs as follows:
• Step I: Extracting sSyVCs from the source code,
namely pieces of code that bear some vulnerability
syntax characteristic(s).
• Step II: Generating iSeVCs from the intermediate
code according to sSyVCs.
The second component uses the intermediate code-based
representation to detect and locate vulnerabilities as follows:
• Step III: Labeling iSeVCs extracted from training
programs as vulnerable or not and vulnerability lo-
cations.
• Step IV: Training a neural network model from the
vector representations of the iSeVCs and their labels.
• Step V: Using the trained neural network model to
detect and locate vulnerabilities in target programs.
Note that the learning phase corresponds to Steps I-IV and
the testing (i.e., detection) phase corresponds to Steps I, II,
and V.
4 INTERMEDIATE CODE-BASED VULNERABILITY
CANDIDATE REPRESENTATION
4.1 Guiding Principles for Vulnerability Candidate Rep-
resentation
It is intuitive that vulnerability detectors should accom-
modate program semantic information, highlighting the
importance of identifying effective vulnerability candidate
representations. For this purpose, we propose using the
following principles to guide the identification of effective
vulnerability candidate representation.
• Principle 1: Accommodating semantically-related
program statements across files. Some files may be
dependent on others because, for example, a variable
used or referred in one file may be defined in another
file. Effective vulnerability candidate representations
should accommodate this define-use relation.
• Principle 2: Accommodating semantically-related
program statements across functions. Semantically-
related statements may go beyond boundaries of
functions, meaning that effective vulnerability candi-
date representations should accommodate, and fur-
ther preserve the order of, those semantically-related
statements, even if they belong to different functions.
4.2 Extracting sSyVCs
As defined above, a sSyVC is a piece of code that is extracted
from a program according to some vulnerability syntax
characteristic(s). There may be many approaches to ob-
taining vulnerability syntax characteristics for vulnerability
detection. As a concrete example, we leverage the syntax
characteristics of known vulnerabilities and represent these
characteristics via Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) of the pro-
gram source code (more precisely, attributes of the nodes on
ASTs). This will ease the extraction of sSyVCs according to
vulnerability syntax characteristics. We define the following
four kinds of vulnerability syntax characteristics, which
are mentioned here because they will be referred in our
examples.
• Library/API Function Call (FC): This vulnerability
syntax characteristic is that the type of a node on the
AST is function call, the function name matches a li-
brary/API function name, and at least one argument
of the function call is a variable.
• Array Definition (AD): This vulnerability syntax
characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST is
variable declaration and the code corresponding to
the node contains characters ‘[’ and ‘]’.
• Pointer Definition (PD): This vulnerability syntax
characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST is
variable declaration and the code corresponding to
the node contains character ‘∗’.
• Arithmetic Expression (AE): This vulnerability syn-
tax characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST
is assignment expression and the node has at least
one variable at the right-hand side of the assignment
expression.
Given the source code of a program, one can generate its
AST(s), from which sSyVCs can be extracted by identifying
the nodes whose type and code match some vulnerability
syntax characteristics. We reiterate that these syntax char-
acteristics themselves are far from adequate in detecting
vulnerabilities because they cannot accommodate the due
semantic information that is related to vulnerabilities.
Figure 4(a) is an example showing the sSyVCs (high-
lighted by boxes) in a program: sSyVCs related to the
FC-kind vulnerability syntax characteristics include “printf”
(Line 6), “memset” (Lines 14 and 23), and “memmove” (Line
25); sSyVCs related to the AD-kind vulnerability syntax
characteristics include “dataBuffer” (Line 10) and “source”
(Line 11); sSyVCs related to the PD-kind vulnerability
syntax characteristics include “data” (Line 2); and sSyVCs
related to the AE-kind vulnerability syntax characteristics
include “data=dataBuffer-8” (Line 19).
4.3 Generating iSeVCs
In order to generate iSeVCs, we propose focusing on the
LLVM intermediate code, namely the LLVM Intermediate
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Fig. 3. Overview of VulDeeLocator with two components: intermediate code-based vulnerability candidate representation and fine-grained
vulnerability detection. The learning phase consists of Steps I-IV and the testing (i.e., detection) phase consists of Steps I, II, and V.
(a) Source program
(c)  Generating an LLVM slice 
corresponding to each sSyVC; example is 
for sSyVC “data” (Line 2)
1  #define N 100
2  char *data;
3  void printLine()
4  {
5      if(data != "") 
6           printf("%s\n", data);
7   }
8  int main()
9  {
10   char dataBuffer[N];
11   char source[N];
12   int m=99;
13   ...
14   memset(dataBuffer, 'A', N<m?N:99);
15   dataBuffer[99] = '\0';
16   ...
17   while(dataBuffer != "")
18   {
19        data = dataBuffer - 8;
20        break;
21    }
22   ...
23   memset(source, 'C', 99); 
24   source[99] = '\0'; 
25   memmove(data, source, N*sizeof(char));
26   data[99] = '\0';
27   printLine();
28   return 0;
29 }
 @data = common global i8* null, align 4
  ...
define void @printLine() #0 {
  %1 = load i8*, i8** @data, align 4
  %2 = icmp ne i8* %1, getelementptr inbounds ([1 x i8], [1 
            x i8]* @.str, i32 0, i32 0)
  br i1 %2, label %3, label %safe_return
  %4 = load i8*, i8** @data, align 4
  %5 = call i32 (i8*, ...) @printf(i8* getelementptr inbounds  
           ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str.1, i32 0, i32 0), i8* %4)
}
define i32 @main() #0 {
  …
  %4 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
           i32 0, i32 0
  %5 = load i32, i32* %3, align 4
  %6 = icmp slt i32 100, %5
  %7 = select i1 %6, i32 100, i32 99
  call void  @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %4, i8 65, i32 %7, i32 
         1, i1 false)
  %8 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
           i32 0, i32 99
  store i8 0, i8* %8, align 1
  ...
  %10 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
             i32 0, i32 0
  %11 = icmp ne i8* %10, getelementptr inbounds ([1 x i8], 
             [1 x i8]* @.str, i32 0, i32 0)
  br i1 %11, label %12, label %15
  %13 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
             i32 0, i32 0
  %14 = getelementptr inbounds i8, i8* %13, i32 -8
  store i8* %14, i8** @data, align 4
  ...
  %16 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %2, 
              i32 0, i32 0
  call void  @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %16, i8 67, i32 99, 
         i32 1, i1 false)
  …
  call vo id  @printLine()
}
 @data = common global i8* null, align 4
  ...
define i32 @main() #0 {
  …
  %4 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
           i32 0, i32 0
  %5 = load i32, i32* %3, align 4
  %6 = icmp slt i32 100, %5
  %7 = select i1 %6, i32 100, i32 99
  call void  @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %4, i8 65, i32 %7, i32 
         1, i1 false)
  %8 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
           i32 0, i32 99
  store i8 0, i8* %8, align 1
  ...
  %10 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
             i32 0, i32 0
  %11 = icmp ne i8* %10, getelementptr inbounds ([1 x i8], 
             [1 x i8]* @.str, i32 0, i32 0)
  br i1 %11, label %12, label %15
  %13 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %1, 
             i32 0, i32 0
  %14 = getelementptr inbounds i8, i8* %13, i32 -8
  store i8* %14, i8** @data, align 4
  ...
  %16 = getelementptr inbounds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %2, 
              i32 0, i32 0
  call vo id  @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %16, i8 67, i32 99, 
         i32 1, i1 false)
  …
  call void @printLine()
 define void @printLine() #0 {
  %17 = load i8*, i8** @data, align 4
  %18 = icmp ne i8* %17, getelementptr inbounds ([1 x i8], 
           [1 x i8]* @.str, i32 0, i32 0)
  br i1 %18, label %19, label %safe_return
  %20 = load i8*, i8** @data, align 4
  %21 = call i32 (i8*,...) @printf(i8* getelementptr inbounds  
           ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str.1, i32 0, i32 0), i8* %20)
 }
}
(d) Generating iSeVCs; the statements 
belonging to printLine() in the LLVM slice 
(indicated by a dashed box) are moved 
An LLVM bitcode file
(b) Generating linked LLVM 
bitcode files
Fig. 4. (a): An example showing the sSyVCs (highlighted by boxes) that are extracted from the program in Figure 2; (b)-(d): An example showing
the generation of iSeVCs from the sSyVC “data” (Line 2).
Representation (LLVM IR) [28], because it is widely used
for C programs. We propose Algorithm 1 for generating
iSeVCs from sSyVCs and the LLVM intermediate code; this
algorithm can be adapted to accommodate other interme-
diate code. Corresponding to the afore-presented Princi-
ples, Algorithm 1 has three components: generating linked
LLVM bitcode files; generating LLVM slices corresponding
to sSyVCs; and generating iSeVCs.
Generating linked LLVM bitcode files (enforcing Principle
1). This component generates one or multiple linked LLVM
bitcode files from source programs as follows (Lines 4-12):
(i) use the Clang compiler [29] to generate LLVM bitcode
files; (ii) link the LLVM bitcode files according to their
dependency relationships, leading to one or multiple linked
LLVM bitcode files. Figure 4(b) illustrates the idea using
the example sSyVC “data” in Line 2 of the source program
described in Figure 4(a).
Generating LLVM slices corresponding to sSyVCs and
generating iSeVCs together (enforcing Principle 2). For
each sSyVC extracted from Step I, one can generate an
LLVM slice corresponding to the sSyVC as follows (Lines
13-20):
• Generate the dependence graph by computing the
control dependencies and data dependencies from
the linked LLVM bitcode file.
• Slice the dependence graph according to each sSyVC
[23] such that (i) in an LLVM slice, each local variable
is represented as a numeric value with prefix “%”,
and (ii) for each function in the LLVM slice, the
numeric value for the first local variable is “1”, and
the numeric value is increased by 1 for each local
variable thereafter.
As an example, we mention that tools like dg [30] can
generate LLVM slices corresponding to sSyVCs. Figure 4(c)
6Algorithm 1 Generating iSeVCs from the intermediate code
Input: A source program P = {p1, . . . , pn}; a set Y =
{yi,j,k,z} of sSyVCs
Output: The set of iSeVCs E
1: E ← ∅; {the set of iSeVCs}
2: P ′ ← ∅; {the set of LLVM bitcode files corresponding to source
program files in P}
3: B ← ∅; {the set of linked LLVM bitcode files for P}
4: for each pi ∈ P do
5: Use Clang to compile pi to an LLVM bitcode file p′i;
6: P ′ ← P ′ ∪ {p′i};
7: end for
8: Group the LLVM bitcode files in P ′ by dependency relationships;
9: for each group Gµ do
10: Link the LLVM bitcode files in Gµ to an LLVM bitcode file b′µ;
11: B ← B ∪ {b′µ};
12: end for
13: for each yi,j,k,z ∈ Y do
14: for each b′µ ∈ B do
15: if the bitcode file corresponding to pi is linked to b′µ then
16: Generate the LLVM slice ei,j,k,z corresponding to yi,j,k,z
from b′µ;
17: E ← E ∪ {ei,j,k,z};
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: for each ei,j,k,z ∈ E do
22: for each function f ′γ called by function f ′α do
23: The statements in ei,j,k,z of f ′γ are appended to the statement
(in f ′α) calling function f ′γ ;
24: Modify each numeric value with prefix “%” in the appended
statements to a new numeric value that has not been used in
f ′α;
25: end for
26: end for
27: return E;
illustrates that the LLVM slice corresponding to sSyVC
“data”.
Finally, iSeVCs (i.e., program statements that are seman-
tically related to sSyVCs) are generated as follows (Lines
21-26). For each function f ′γ that is called by function f
′
α, the
statements in the LLVM slice of function f ′γ are appended to
the statement (in function f ′α) that calls function f
′
γ . This is
to preserve the order of statements that possibly belong to
different functions but are related to each other (because of
some control dependency and/or data dependency).
Figure 4(d) illustrates that the statements in the LLVM
slice of function printLine, which is highlighted by the
dashed box, are appended to the statement “call void @print-
Line()” in the calling function main. In order to avoid as-
signing the same numeric value to different local variables
in the LLVM slices of different functions, each numeric
value with prefix “%” (i.e., local variable) in the appended
statements is modified to a new numeric value that has not
been used in the calling function. In the example shown
in Figure 4(d), the local variable “%1” in the LLVM slice
of function printLine is modified to “%17” because “16” is
the last assigned numeric value in function main, which is
shown in Figure 4(c).
Remark. The inadequacy of source code-based representa-
tions in conveying semantic information, which is shown in
the two examples discussed in Section 2.1, is overcome by
the use of intermediate code. Specifically, the iSeVC shown
in Figure 4(d) involves statements “%6=icmp slt i32 100, %5”
and “%7=select i1 %6, i32 100, i32 99” in the intermediate
code; these statements expose the control flow of the con-
ditional operator that cannot be conveyed by source code-
based representations. Moreover, the iSeVC shown in Figure
4(d) can identify that “N” in “N<m?N:99” (Line 14) takes the
value “100” because of the corresponding intermediate code
“%6=icmp slt i32 100, %5” and “%7=select i1 %6, i32 100, i32
99”.
5 FINE-GRAINED VULNERABILITY DETECTION
5.1 Requirements for Fine-grained Vulnerability Detec-
tors
We propose the following three requirements for neural
network models that aim to detect and locate vulnerabili-
ties. These requirements are centered at the novel idea of
granularity refinement.
• Requirement 1: Granularity refinement. In order
to pin down vulnerabilities, the granularity of the
output of a neural network vulnerability detector
should be finer than that of the input.
• Requirement 2: Easy mapping. It should be easy
to map the output of a neural network (at a re-
fined granularity) back to the iSeVCs to pinpoint
vulnerabilities. The output should be a sequence of
tokens, where one or multiple consecutive tokens
correspond to a same line of code in the intermediate
code. These lines of intermediate code can be easily
mapped back to iSeVCs, and therefore the vulnerable
lines of code in source programs.
• Requirement 3: Attention taking. Some parts of an
iSeVC may be more important than others and thus
should be paid more attention by a neural network;
i.e., it should take advantage of the “attention” (i.e.,
more important parts) highlighted in an input.
5.2 Labeling iSeVCs
We label each iSeVC from training programs as follows: If an
iSeVC contains a known vulnerability, the iSeVC is labeled
with the line number(s) of the vulnerability in the iSeVC
(i.e. location of the vulnerability), denoted by x1, . . . , xζ
where x (1 ≤  ≤ ζ) is a line number corresponding to
the vulnerability; otherwise, the iSeVC is labeled as “0” (i.e.,
containing no vulnerability). Since a vulnerability dataset
should provide the locations (e.g., line numbers) of vulner-
abilities in the intermediate code of a source program, these
line numbers of vulnerabilities in the source program need
to be mapped to the line numbers in the intermediate code,
which can be done simply by leveraging a textual LLVM file
that comes with debugging information [31].
5.3 Training a Neural Network Model
Each iSeVC needs to be encoded into a vector, which is used
as an input to a neural network. In order to make iSeVCs in-
dependent of user-defined function names while capturing
program semantic information, this step maps user-defined
function names to symbolic names (e.g., “FUN1”, “FUN2”)
in a one-to-one fashion. It is worth mentioning that iSeVCs
are already independent of local variable names because the
latter are replaced with symbolic names in the intermediate
7code. Then, a word embedding method can be used to en-
code iSeVCs into vectors. Since the lengths of the resulting
vectors (representing iSeVCs) can be different and a neural
network takes input vectors of a fixed-length θ, these vectors
may need to be adjusted as follows: If a vector is shorter
than θ, zeroes are padded to the end of the vector; if a
vector is longer than θ, the vector is truncated to length θ to
make the sSyVC appear in the middle of the resulting vector
[18]. Finally, the vectors are used as the input to a neural
network that satisfies the aforementioned Requirements 1-
3 (i.e., granularity refinement, easy mapping, and attention
taking). In what follows, we elaborate the neural network
BRNN-vdl we propose, which satisfies the aforementioned
Requirements 1-3.
5.3.1 BRNNs achieve easy mapping
One may suggest to use Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNNs), such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and
Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [32], [33], to achieve easy map-
ping. This seems reasonable because RNNs are effective in
coping with sequential data and the output at each time
step corresponds to a token in an iSeVC, which makes it
easy to map the output back to iSeVCs. However, uni-
directional RNNs are not sufficient because a statement
in a program may be affected by some preceding and/or
subsequent statements in the program. Nevertheless, BRNNs,
such as Bidirectional LSTM (BLSTM) and Bidirectional GRU
(BGRU) can indeed achieve easy mapping, while accommo-
dating preceding and subsequent statements.
BRNNs cannot achieve the other two properties because
their output granularity is the same as, rather than refining,
the input granularity because they treat every part of an
input equally. For vulnerability detection, some parts (i.e.,
vulnerable lines of code) of an iSeVC may be more impor-
tant than the other parts of the iSeVC and should be paid
more attention by neural networks.
5.3.2 BRNN-vdl: A novel variant of BRNN further achieving
attention taking and granularity refinement
Figure 5 highlights the structure of BRNN-vdl, which ex-
tends the standard BRNN with three extra layers that for-
mulate the “vdl” part to achieve granularity refinement and
attention taking. The input to BRNN-vdl includes (i) the
vectors that represent the iSeVCs, and (ii) a vulnerability lo-
cation matrix that represents the locations of vulnerabilities
in each vector. The learning phase outputs a BRNN-vdl with
fine-tuned parameters. In what follows, we briefly review
BRNN and then describe the three extra layers in BRNN-
vdl we introduce.
Overview of the BRNN component in BRNN-vdl. As
shown in Figure 5, the standard BRNN has (i) a number
of BRNN layers, which connect the RNN cells (e.g., LSTM
and GRU) in both forward and backward directions, (ii) a
dense layer, which reduces the number of dimensions of the
vectors received from the BRNN layers, and (iii) an activa-
tion layer, which uses an activation function to generate the
output at a time step. In the context of the present paper,
the input is the vectors representing the labelled iSeVCs.
Each time step corresponds to a token in an iSeVC. At time
step τ , where 1 ≤ τ ≤ λ and λ is the number of tokens in
BRNN 
layers
Dense
layer
Activation
layer
... ... ...
... ... ...
... ... ...
...
... ... ... ... ..
. ..
.
Time 1 2 τ τ+1τ+wϵ-1 λ 
Vectors 
corresponding 
to iSeVCs
κ-max 
pooling layer
... ... ... Vulnerability 
location matrix
Standard 
BRNN 
Average 
pooling layer
... ...
Multiply
layer
...
Fig. 5. BRNN-vdl extends BRNN with three extra layers (i.e., the multiply,
κ-max pooling, and average pooling layers) that formulate the “vdl” part
to achieve three desired properties.
each iSeVC, the output of the BRNN layers for iSeVC ei,j,k,z ,
denoted by gτ (ei,j,k,z), is
gτ (ei,j,k,z) = φ(gτ−1(ei,j,k,z), gτ+1(ei,j,k,z), ei,j,k,z,ω,β),
(1)
where ω is a weight vector, β is a bias vector, gτ−1(ei,j,k,z)
and gτ+1(ei,j,k,z) are respectively the output of the BRNN
layers at time steps τ − 1 and τ + 1, and function φ
indicates that the output of BRNN layers is represented
by its parameters that include gτ−1(ei,j,k,z), gτ+1(ei,j,k,z),
ei,j,k,z , ω, and β. How these parameters exactly interact
with each other depends on the RNN cells, such as LSTM
and GRU (see [32], [33] for more information). For iSeVC
ei,j,k,z , the output vector of the standard BRNN Ai,j,k,z
(i.e., the output vector of the activation layer) is denoted by
Ai,j,k,z = (g1(ei,j,k,z), . . . , gλ(ei,j,k,z)). (2)
The multiply layer achieves attention taking. For the
iSeVCs that are vulnerable, the multiply layer is meant
to select the outputs of the tokens that correspond to the
vulnerable lines of code. These selected outputs will be used
in the subsequent layers and the back propagation process
of BRNN-vdl because they would help locate vulnerabilities
with a higher precision (than not using this multiply layer).
For the iSeVCs that are not vulnerable, the multiply layer
is meant to select all outputs of the tokens and use them in
the subsequent layers and the back propagation process of
BRNN-vdl, because these tokens are equally important as
far as the learning phase is concerned.
Formally, for iSeVC ei,j,k,z , the multiply layer multiplies
the output vector of the activation layer Ai,j,k,z with the
vulnerability location matrix Li,j,k,z . The output vector of
the multiply layer Mi,j,k,z is denoted by
Mi,j,k,z = Ai,j,k,zLi,j,k,z, (3)
where Li,j,k,z is a diagonal matrix with Li,j,k,z =
diag(α1, α2, . . . , αλ). For a vulnerable iSeVC, let us denote
by x′ the location of the first token in the vulnerable line x
for some 1 ≤  ≤ ζ , and by w the number of tokens in x.
8The value of αϕ (1 ≤ ϕ ≤ λ) is determined as follows: For
the iSeVCs that are vulnerable, if ϕ ∈ {x′, . . . , x′ +w − 1},
then we set αϕ = 1; otherwise, we set αϕ = 0. For
the iSeVCs that are not vulnerable, we set αϕ = 1 for
1 ≤ ϕ ≤ λ. This design choice can be justified as follows:
For each iSeVC that is not vulnerable, all tokens should
be equally treated because no line of code is vulnerable.
However, a vulnerable iSeVC contains (i) one or multiple
vulnerable lines of code, which should be highlighted for
vulnerability locating purposes, and (ii) possibly a large
number of lines of code that are not vulnerable, which only
provide the context for vulnerability detection. If all tokens
in a vulnerable iSeVC are equally treated, a false-negative
can occur because most lines of code are not vulnerable.
The κ-max pooling layer and the average pooling layer
together achieve granularity refinement. The κ-max pooling
layer is meant to select the κ largest values among the
elements in the output vector of the multiply layerMi,j,k,z .
The average pooling layer is meant to compute the average of
the outputs of the κ-max pooling layer. Intuitively, these
two layers together achieve granularity refinement because
(i) they further select the outputs of the multiply layer to
obtain the output corresponding to each iSeVC, which is
used for back propagation, and (ii) they take into account
both the maximum and the average.
Formally, for an iSeVC ei,j,k,z , the output of average
pooling layer oi,j,k,z is defined as
oi,j,k,z = ave(maxκ(Mi,j,k,z)), (4)
where function maxκ returns the κ largest elements in the
vector, and function ave returns the average of the κ largest
elements. After conducting iterative forward and backward
propagations, the training process converges to a BRNN-vdl
with fine-tuned parameters, which encodes vulnerability
patterns in the training data.
5.4 Detecting and Locating Vulnerabilities
Figure 6 highlights using the learned BRNN-vdl to detect
and locate vulnerabilities in target programs. The input
is the vectors representing the iSeVCs extracted from the
target programs. For generating outputs, we first compute
the average of the κ largest values for the tokens in each
line. Then, we extract the lines whose output is larger than
the threshold ϑ, leading to vulnerable iSeVCs and lines of
code. Finally, we map these vulnerable lines of code to the
vulnerable lines of source code as the output of the detection
phase.
6 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Our experiments use a machine with a NVIDIA GeForce
GTX 1080 GPU and an Intel Xeon E5-1620 CPU operating at
3.50GHz.
6.1 Research Questions
We gear our experiments towards answering the following
four Research Questions (RQs):
• RQ1: Can intermediate code-based vulnerability can-
didate representation be leveraged to achieve a sub-
stantially higher vulnerability detection capability?
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Fig. 6. Using the learned BRNN-vdl to detect vulnerabilities in target
programs, where the dashed box highlights the tokens extracted from a
line of code.
• RQ2: Can BRNN-vdl achieve a substantially higher
vulnerability locating precision than BRNN?
• RQ3: How effective and precise is VulDeeLocator
in detecting and locating vulnerabilities of target
programs with known ground truth?
• RQ4: How effective and precise is VulDeeLocator
in detecting and locating vulnerabilities of real-
world software products for which we do not know
whether they contain vulnerabilities or not?
6.2 Evaluation Metrics
We propose using five standard metrics to measure the de-
tection capability of a vulnerability detector (see, e.g., [34]).
Let TP denote the number of vulnerable samples that are
detected as vulnerable (i.e., true-positives), FP denote the
number of samples that are not vulnerable but are detected
as vulnerable (i.e., false-positives), TN denote the number
of samples that are not vulnerable and are not detected as
vulnerable (i.e., true-negatives), FN denote the number of
vulnerable samples that are not detected as vulnerable (i.e.,
false-negatives). The five metrics are: (i) false-positive rate
FPR = FPFP+TN ; (ii) false-negative rate FNR =
FN
TP+FN ; (iii)
accuracy A = TP+TNTP+FP+TN+FN ; (iv) precision P =
TP
TP+FP ; (v)
F1-measure F1 = 2·P ·(1−FNR)P+(1−FNR) , or the overall effectiveness.
In order to evaluate the locating precision of a vulnera-
bility detector, we propose using the standard Intersection
over Union (IoU) metric with IoU = |U∩V||U∪V| , where U is the
set of truly vulnerable lines of code and V is the set of
detected vulnerable lines of code [35]. Figure 7 illustrates the
meaning of IoU with respect to one iSeVC; as highlighted
by boxes, U contains 4 statements, V contains 3 statements,
U ∩ V contains 2 statements (i.e., |U ∩ V | = 2), and
U ∪ V contains 5 statements (i.e., |U ∪ V | = 5), leading
to IoU = 2/5. Intuitively, IoU reflects the degree at which
the detected vulnerable statements overlap with the truly
vulnerable statements. The closer the IoU is to 1, the higher
the locating precision.
6.3 Preparing the Input to VulDeeLocator
We collect the source code of C programs from two vul-
nerability sources: the NVD [25] and the Software Assur-
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Fig. 7. An example illustrating the meaning of IoU, where a dashed line
represents a program statement.
ance Reference Dataset (SARD) [36]. The programs collected
from the NVD are accompanied by their diff files, which
describe the difference between the programs before and
after patching the vulnerabilities in question. The programs
collected from the SARD are accompanied by labels, which
indicate whether they are vulnerable or not. Note that SARD
contains production, synthetic, and academic programs (i.e.,
test cases). We filter out the programs that cannot be com-
piled into the LLVM intermediate code. We also filter out
those programs whose length is less than 500 lines of code,
which are not so useful for our purposes because they
are mainly simple synthetic programs that contain limited
functionalities.
For training purpose, we collect 10,246 programs that
may or may not be vulnerable, including 382 programs from
the NVD and 9,864 from the SARD. The training set contains
11 types of vulnerabilities: CWE-20, CWE-78, CWE-119,
CWE-121, CWE-122, CWE-124, CWE-126, CWE-127, CWE-
134, CWE-189, and CWE-399, where each type is uniquely
identified by a Common Weakness Enumeration IDentifier
(CWE ID) [37]. For testing purpose, we randomly collect
2,561 programs from the SARD as the target programs with
known ground truth, meaning an 80:20 ratio of training vs.
testing data. The 2,561 programs involve (i) 2,038 programs
containing 7 (of the 11) types of vulnerabilities mentioned
above, and (ii) 523 programs containing 5 types of vulner-
abilities (i.e., CWE-194, CWE-195, CWE-197, CWE-590, and
CWE-690), which are however not contained in any of the
training programs.
6.4 Intermediate Code-based Vulnerability Candidate
Extracting sSyVCs. In order to extract sSyVCs from the
source code, we use Clang [29] to generate ASTs from a
source program. Then, we traverse the ASTs to generate
sSyVCs. For obtaining vulnerability syntax characteristics,
we leverage the C vulnerability rules of the commercial
tool Checkmarx [7] because we found that the syntax
characteristics from these rules have a good coverage over
known vulnerabilities. This leads to the four kinds of vul-
nerability syntax characteristics mentioned above, namely
Library/API Function Call (FC), Array Definition (AD),
Pointer Definition (PD), and Arithmetic Expression (AE).
These characteristics cover 9,884 (i.e., 98.3%) of the vulnera-
ble programs collected from the NVD and the SARD.
Take vulnerabilities of the FC-kind (i.e., Library/API
function call) as an example, the syntax characteristic is
that the type of a node on the AST in question is function
call, the function name matches a library/API function
name, and at least one argument of the function call is a
variable. Given the ASTs of a source program, the matching
algorithm proceeds as follows: (i) we first traverse the ASTs
to identify the nodes whose type is “CxCursor CallExpr”
(meaning a function call); (ii) identify the nodes whose
token matches a library/API function name (e.g., memset);
(iii) traverse the children of the node corresponding to a
library/API function call to identify the nodes whose type
is “CxCursor DeclRefExpr” (meaning a variable argument);
and (iv) a library/API function call together with its variable
arguments is extracted as a sSyVC. In total, we extract
119,782 sSyVCs, including 29,782 sSyVCs of the FC-kind,
29,273 sSyVCs of the AD-kind, 38,063 sSyVCs of the PD-
kind, and 22,664 sSyVCs of the AE-kind from the training
programs.
Generating iSeVCs. We use tool dg [30] to generate LLVM-
based intermediate code slices corresponding to given
source code sSyVCs as follows. For each given source code
sSyVC, the corresponding iSeVC is a slice of intermediate
code statements consisting of: (i) the intermediate code
statements corresponding to the given source code sSyVC;
and (ii) any intermediate code statement that has a data-
dependence or control-dependence with any of the variables
that are used or defined in the given sSyVC. Note that
the statements in (ii) may belong to different functions or
files than the one to which the given sSyVC belongs. Take
the sSyVC “data” (Line 2) in Figure 4(a) as an example,
the LLVM-based intermediate code slices (i.e., LLVM slices)
corresponding to “data” generated by dg is described in
Figure 4(c). Then, we use Algorithm 1 to generate iSeVCs.
In total, we extract 119,782 iSeVCs from training programs.
The second column of Table 1 summarizes the number of
iSeVCs in each kind of sSyVCs.
TABLE 1
The total number (#) of iSeVCs, vulnerable iSeVCs, and non-vulnerable
iSeVCs (i.e., not vulnerable) extracted from the training programs.
Kind of sSyVCs #iSeVCs #vul. iSeVCs #non-vul. iSeVCs
FC-kind 29,782 6,606 23,176
AD-kind 29,273 8,381 20,892
PD-kind 38,063 11,089 26,974
AE-kind 22,664 4,125 18,539
Total 119,782 30,201 89,581
6.5 Fine-grained Vulnerability Detection
Labeling iSeVCs. For the iSeVCs extracted from programs
collected from NVD, we focus on the vulnerabilities that
are accompanied by diff files that involve line deletion or line
movement because they allow us to pin down the locations
of these vulnerabilities (i.e., statements prefixed by “-” in
a diff file). If (i) an iSeVC contains some intermediate code
that corresponds to one or multiple statements prefixed by
“-” in the diff file and (ii) the program in question contains a
known vulnerability, then the iSeVC is labeled as the line
number(s) of the vulnerability in the intermediate code;
otherwise, the iSeVC is labeled as “0” (i.e., not vulnerable).
For iSeVCs extracted from programs collected from the
SARD, if an iSeVC contains some intermediate code that
corresponds to one or multiple vulnerable statements in
the source program, then the iSeVC is labeled as the line
number(s) of the vulnerability in the intermediate code;
otherwise, the iSeVC is labeled as “0” (i.e., not vulnerable).
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 respectively list the
numbers of vulnerable iSeVCs and non-vulnerable iSeVCs
in each kind of sSyVCs.
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Training, detecting and locating. In order to use neural
networks, we need to encode iSeVCs into vectors. For this
purpose, we first divide each iSeVC into a sequence of
tokens via lexical analysis (e.g., “call”, “void”, “@”, “FUN1”,
“(”, and “)”), and then transform each token to a fixed-
length vector via word2vec tool [38]. Finally, a token-level
vector for each iSeVC is obtained by concatenating the
token-level vectors in sequence. Each token is encoded into
a vector of length 30, and each iSeVC is represented by a
vector of length θ=27,000, which means that the first 900
tokens of an iSeVC are considered.
We implement the BRNN-vdl in Python using Tensor-
Flow [39] together with Keras [40]. We use a 5-fold cross
validation to train the BRNN-vdl and choose the parameter
values that lead to the highest F1-measure. We implement
two instances of BRNN: one is BLSTM, which leads to
“VulDeeLocator-BLSTM”; the other is BGRU, which leads to
“VulDeeLocator-BGRU”. Take VulDeeLocator-BGRU as an
example, the trained hyper-parameters are: output dimen-
sion is 512; the number of hidden layers is 2; the number of
hidden nodes at each layer is 900; batch size is 16; minibatch
stochastic gradient descent together with ADAMAX [41] is
used; learning rate is 0.002; dropout is 0.4; the number of
epochs is 10; and κ = 1.
For detecting vulnerabilities in target programs, we first
compute the average of the κ largest values among the
tokens in each line of intermediate code. Then, we extract
the lines whose output is larger than threshold ϑ (e.g., 0.5).
These lines of code are the vulnerable ones, and are mapped
back to the vulnerable lines of source code as the output of
the testing (i.e., detection) phase.
6.6 Experiments for Answering RQ1
In order to evaluate the advantages of intermediate code-
based vulnerability candidate representation over source
code-based one, we conduct experiments with the following
two vulnerability candidate representations:
• source code- and Semantics-based Vulnerability
Candidate (sSeVC): A sSeVC is a sequence of source
code statements that have some data-dependence
or control-dependence with a sSyVC (i.e., source
code- and Syntax-based Vulnerability Candidate, as
defined in Section 2.2) and can be obtained by using
a source code static analysis tool (e.g., Joern [26]).
• iSeVC: An iSeVC is a sequence of intermediate
code statements that have some data-dependence or
control-dependence with a sSyVC. Compared with
source code-based representation, iSeVC is in the
static single assignment (i.e., SSA) form, which as-
sures that each variable is defined-and-then-used
and is assigned exactly once.
We report the experimental results with VulDeeLocator-
BGRU, while noting that experimental results with Vul-
DeeLocator-BLSTM are similar. Table 2 summarizes the
comparison. We observe that iSeVCs lead to better re-
sults than sSeVCs, including a 1.7% improvement in false-
positive rate, a 28.8% improvement in false-negative rate,
a 9.9% improvement in accuracy, a 3.2% improvement in
precision, and a 18.3% improvement in F1-measure. This can
be attributed to the two advantages of intermediate code-
based representation: (i) intermediate code is in the SSA
form, which can expose more information about control-
flows and the define-use relations between variables; (ii)
intermediate code-based vulnerability candidates can cap-
ture more semantic information (e.g. the relations between
the definitions of types or macros and their uses), which
however may not be identified by sSeVCs. This is justified
by the following two examples.
TABLE 2
Vulnerability detection capability of VulDeeLocator-BGRU using two
different kinds of vulnerability candidate representations, indicating that
intermediate code-based representation is more effective than source
code-based representation.
Vulnerability
candidate Representation
FPR
(%)
FNR
(%)
A
(%)
P
(%)
F1
(%)
sSeVC Sourcecode-based 2.2 32.8 86.1 94.9 78.7
iSeVC Intermediatecode-based 0.5 4.0 96.0 98.1 97.0
1   …
2  #define COMMAND_ARG2 "ls "
3  #define COMMAND_ARG3 data
4  #define EXECL execl
5  …
6  void CWE78_OS_Command_Injection__char_console_execl_12_bad()
7  {
8      char * data;
9      char dataBuffer[100] = COMMAND_ARG2;
10    data = dataBuffer;
11    …
12    size_t dataLen = strlen(data);
13    …
14    if (fgets(data+dataLen, (int)(100-dataLen), stdin) != NULL)
15    {
16          dataLen = strlen(data);
17          if (dataLen > 0 && data[dataLen-1] == '\n')
18          {
19                data[dataLen-1] = '\0';
20          }
21    }
22    …
23    EXECL(COMMAND_INT_PATH, COMMAND_INT_PATH, COMMAND_ARG1, 
                    COMMAND_ARG2, COMMAND_ARG3, NULL);
24 }
25  ...
1  ...
2  static char * CWE127_Buffer_Underread__malloc_char_memcpy_45_badData;
3  …
4  static void badSink()
5  {
6     char * data = CWE127_Buffer_Underread__malloc_char_memcpy_45_badData;
7     char dest[100];
8     memset(dest, 'C', 100-1); 
9     dest[100-1] = '\0'; 
10   memcpy(dest, data, 100*sizeof(char));
11   dest[100-1] = '\0';
12   ...
13 }
14 void CWE127_Buffer_Underread__malloc_char_memcpy_45_bad()
15 {
16    char * data;
17    data = NULL;
18    char * dataBuffer = (char *)malloc(100*sizeof(char));
19    ...
20    memset(dataBuffer, 'A', 100-1);
21    dataBuffer[100-1] = '\0';
22    data = dataBuffer - 8;
23    CWE127_Buffer_Underread__malloc_char_memcpy_45_badData = data;
24    badSink();
25 }
26 ...
(a) Test case 244486
(b) Test case 234895
Fig. 8. Two examples of vulnerabilities that are missed by
VulDeeLocator-BGRU trained from sSeVCs.
Figure 8(a) shows one example, which is dubbed test case
244486 because it is derived from the SARD dataset [36].
This example contains an OS command injection vulnera-
bility because the input is received from the console and
is used without validating it (vulnerable Line 23). Consider
sSyVC “data” in Line 8. Since the source code parsing (e.g.
when using Joern [26]) cannot deal with macro definitions,
“COMMAND ARG3” in Line 23 cannot be identified as
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“data”. As a consequence, the corresponding sSeVC fails
to identify the vulnerable statement in Line 23. This ex-
plains the false-negative. On the other hand, the iSeVCs
can identify the “COMMAND ARG3” in Line 23 as “data”
after compilation. This explains why the resulting model can
detect the vulnerability.
Figure 8(b) shows another example, dubbed test
case 234895. The example contains a buffer under-read
vulnerability because the copy from a memory location
may be located before the source buffer (vulnerable
Line 10). Consider sSyVC “data” in Line 6. Since the
source code parsing (e.g. when using Joern [26]) cannot
deal with global variables, the sSeVC corresponding to
sSyVC “data” in Line 6 does not contain the statements
that are semantically related to sSyVC “data” via the
global variable CWE127 Buffer Underread malloc char
memcpy 45 badData in function CWE127 Buffer Un-
derread malloc char memcpy 45 bad. The root cause of
the vulnerability is that the data pointer points to a
memory address that is different from the allocated
memory buffer (Line 22), which is defined in function
CWE127 Buffer Underread malloc char memcpy 45 bad.
This explains why the vulnerability is missed. However, the
model learned from iSeVCs can identify and accommodate
these statements because they are semantically related to
the global variable. In summary, we answer RQ1 with the
following:
Insight 1.
VulDeeLocator leveraging intermediate code-based rep-
resentation is substantially more effective than VulDee-
Locator using source code-based representation, owing
to the aforementioned two advantages of intermediate
code-based representation.
6.7 Experiments for Answering RQ2
In order to see the capability of BRNN-vdl in locating
vulnerabilities, we conduct experiments to compare BRNN-
vdl and BRNN while using two types of vulnerability
candidates (i.e., source code-based sSeVCs vs. intermediate
code-based iSeVCs as specified in Section 6.6). In what
follows, we report the experimental results of using BGRU
to instantiate BRNN, while noting that similar results are
observed when using BLSTM to instantiate BRNN.
TABLE 3
Comparing BRNN-vdl with BRNN (more specifically, BGRU-vdl vs.
BGRU), where IoU is averaged over the IoUs measured between the
detected vulnerable code and the ground-truth vulnerable code in the
test data and |V| is the average number of detected vulnerable lines of
source code.
Vulnerability
candidate Model
FPR
(%)
FNR
(%)
A
(%)
P
(%)
F1
(%)
IoU
(%) |V|
sSeVC
BRNN
-vdl 2.2 32.8 86.1 94.9 78.7 29.9 3.4
BRNN 8.4 28.1 84.1 84.1 77.5 7.4 14.8
iSeVC
BRNN
-vdl 0.5 4.0 96.0 98.1 97.0 32.7 2.2
BRNN 2.3 5.4 97.0 92.0 93.3 10.1 19.9
Table 3 presents the comparison. For locating vulnera-
bilities, BRNN-vdl achieves, on average, a 22.6% higher IoU
than BRNN because the number of detected vulnerable lines
of code is 2.8 for BRNN-vdl and 17.4 for BRNN on average.
This can be explained by the fact that BRNN preserves the
input granularity in its output, while BRNN-vdl reduces
the input lines of code to much smaller lines of code in its
output. This “granularity refinement” is accomplished by
the “vdl” part. In terms of vulnerability detection capability,
BRNN-vdl is better than BRNN, with a 6.2% lower false-
positive rate and a 1.2% higher F1-measure at the price
of a 4.7% higher false-negative rate when using sSeVCs
as vulnerability candidates, and with a 1.8% lower false-
positive rate, a 1.4% false-negative rate, and a 3.7% higher
F1-measure when using iSeVCs as vulnerability candidates.
This means that “vdl” can somewhat improve the vulnera-
bility detection capability. This leads to:
Insight 2. BRNN-vdl achieves a substantially higher vul-
nerability locating precision and a somewhat higher
vulnerability detection capability than BRNN.
6.8 Experiments for Answering RQ3
In order to answer RQ3, we compare two instances of
VulDeeLocator and some state-of-the-art vulnerability de-
tectors in terms of their capabilities in detecting and locating
vulnerabilities in target programs with known ground truth.
6.8.1 Comparing VulDeeLocators with two instances of
BRNN (i.e., BLSTM vs. BGRU)
Table 4 highlights the experimental results. We observe that
VulDeeLocator-BGRU simultaneously achieves a 3.8% lower
false-negative rate, a 1.8% higher F1-measure, and a 5.6%
higher IoU than VulDeeLocator-BLSTM. The higher locating
precision may be attributed to the fact that BGRU uses fewer
parameters, possibly making it easier to “refine” the output.
The training time and detection time of VulDeeLocator-
BLSTM are respectively 51,696 seconds and 1,389 seconds,
which are much longer than the training time (32,713 sec-
onds) and detection time (1,325 seconds) of VulDeeLocator-
BGRU. This is because BGRU uses fewer parameters and
would converge faster.
TABLE 4
Effectiveness of VulDeeLocator-BLSTM, VulDeeLocator-BGRU, and
state-of-the-art vulnerability detectors, where IoU is averaged over the
IoUs measured between the detected vulnerable code and the
ground-truth vulnerable code in the test data and |V| is the average
number of detected vulnerable lines of source code.
Method FPR(%)
FNR
(%)
A
(%)
P
(%)
F1
(%)
IoU
(%) |V|
VulDeeLocator with two instances of BRNN
VulDeeLocator
-BLSTM 0.5 7.8 97.7 98.5 95.2 27.1 2.1
VulDeeLocator
-BGRU 0.5 4.0 96.0 98.1 97.0 32.7 2.2
State-of-the-art vulnerability detectors
Flawfinder 10.5 83.7 61.6 48.9 24.5 38.4 7.3
Checkmarx 72.8 54.4 39.1 27.9 34.6 23.8 4.1
Fortify 37.0 54.0 56.5 43.4 44.6 30.9 2.4
VulDeePecker 7.9 49.4 51.0 91.9 65.2 9.0 14.3
SySeVR 10.1 12.2 89.0 84.2 86.0 8.4 16.7
VulDeeLocator-BGRU detects all of the vulnerabilities
in the 2,484 (of the 2,561) target programs, despite that
5 types of detected vulnerabilities did not appear in the
training data. This justifies that pattern-based detector in-
deed can detect some, but not all (as elaborated below),
vulnerabilities that are not in the training data. However,
there are indeed false-negatives, which can be caused by
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inadequate coverage of vulnerability syntax characteristics
and vulnerability types in the training data. For example,
19 false-negatives of VulDeeLocator-BGRU are not covered
by the four kinds of vulnerability syntax characteristics,
highlighting the importance of identifying as-complete-as-
possible vulnerability syntax characteristics. Moreover, an-
other 56 false-negatives of VulDeeLocator-BGRU are caused
by the fact that their corresponding vulnerability types do
not appear in the training data.
Insight 3. The coverage of vulnerability syntax character-
istics and the coverage of vulnerability types in the
training data are key to lowering false-negatives.
6.8.2 Comparing with state-of-the-art pattern-based vul-
nerability detectors
For source code- and rule-based vulnerability detectors,
we consider the open source tool Flawfinder [6] and the
commercial product Checkmarx [7]. For intermediate code-
and rule-based vulnerability detectors, we consider the com-
mercial product Fortify [8]. For deep learning-based vul-
nerability detectors, we consider VulDeePecker [17], which
is designed to detect vulnerabilities related to library/API
function calls, and SySeVR [18], which is designed to detect
multiple types of vulnerabilities. The implementations of
these two tools are obtained from their authors (via private
communications). We choose these systems for comparison
because they are the state-of-the-art and/or available to us.
Table 4 summarizes the comparison. We make the fol-
lowing observations. (i) Source code- and rule-based vul-
nerability detector Flawfinder incurs prohibitively high
false-negative rate, which can be attributed to the inad-
equacy of its parser and patterns [42]. (ii) Source code-
and rule-based vulnerability detector Checkmarx incurs
prohibitively high false-positive rate and false-negative rate,
which can be attributed to the inadequacy of the rules
defined by human experts. This justifies why we only use
the Checkmarx rules to extract sSyVCs as a starting point
for vulnerability detection. (iii) Intermediate code- and
rule-based vulnerability detector Fortify incurs very high
false-positive rate and false-negative rate, suggesting that
rules based on intermediate code can indeed accommodate
more useful information than rules based on source code.
(iv) Deep learning-based detector VulDeePecker is much
less effective than deep learning-based SySeVR because
the former can only cope with the class of vulnerabili-
ties related to library/API function calls [17], but SySeVR
can cope with multiple classes of vulnerabilities [18]. (v)
VulDeeLocator-BGRU achieves respectively an 11.0%, 9.6%,
and 8.2% improvement over SySeVR in F1-measure, false-
positive rate, and false-negative rate, because the former
can accommodate more semantic information conveyed
by intermediate code. (vi) Rule-based vulnerability detec-
tors (i.e., Flawfinder, Checkmarx, and Fortify) achieve an
IoU of 31.0% on average, but their low overall effective-
ness (F1-measure) hinders their usefulness. (vii) IoUs of
VulDeeLocator-BLSTM (27.1%) and VulDeeLocator-BGRU
(32.7%) are much higher than IoUs of VulDeePecker (9.0%)
and SySeVR (8.4%), because the average number of detected
vulnerable lines of code is 2.1 for VulDeeLocator-BLSTM, 2.2
for VulDeeLocator-BGRU, 14.3 for VulDeePecker, and 16.7
for SySeVR. The higher vulnerability locating precision can
be attributed to the vdl-part of BRNN-vdl. In summary, we
draw:
Insight 4. VulDeeLocator is more effective than the
state-of-the-art pattern-based vulnerability detectors in
detecting and locating vulnerabilities. In particular,
VulDeeLocator-BGRU achieves a 3.9X higher locating
precision than the state-of-the-art vulnerability detector
SySeVR.
6.9 Experiments for Answering RQ4
In order to answer RQ4, we apply VulDeeLocator-BGRU,
which is the most effective instance of VulDeeLocator, to
detect vulnerabilities in several versions of 3 software prod-
ucts (i.e., Linux kernel, FFmpeg, and Libav). Since we do
not know whether these products contain vulnerabilities
or not (i.e., the ground truth is not known), we select 200
program files of these software products as the test data,
and manually examine and confirm the vulnerabilities de-
tected from them. VulDeeLocator detects 16 vulnerabilities
from these 200 program files, including 5 false positives.
Among the 11 true positives, 7 vulnerabilities correspond to
known vulnerabilities as shown in Table 5, but the other
4 vulnerabilities are not reported in the NVD as shown
in Table 6. The average IoU, where average is over all of
the detected vulnerabilities (including the 5 false positives),
is 30.2%. For each vulnerability, the average number of
detected vulnerable lines of code is 3.9. Among these 11
vulnerabilities, VulDeePecker [17] missed 9 vulnerabilities
(which is not surprising because these 9 vulnerabilities are
not related to library/API function call) and SySeVR [18]
missed 7 vulnerabilities; moreover, the average number of
detected vulnerable lines of code for VulDeePecker (40.5)
and SySeVR (48.4) is much larger than the average number
of detected vulnerable lines of code for VulDeeLocator (3.9).
TABLE 5
The 7 vulnerabilities detected by VulDeeLocator-BGRU (from 200
program files) that are reported in the NVD, where |V| is the number of
detected vulnerable lines of source code.
Target product CVE ID Vulnerable file IoU(%) |V|
Kind of
sSyVC
FFmpeg 0.8.2 CVE-2011-3973 .../cavsdec.c 40.0 4 PD
FFmpeg 0.9.4 CVE-2011-3934 .../vp3.c 50.0 2 PD
Linux kernel
2.6.29
CVE-2009-1527 .../ptrace.c 25.0 3 PD
CVE-2011-1598 .../bcm.c 25.0 4 PD
CVE-2011-3637 .../task mmu.c 50.0 2 PD
Linux kernel
3.7.9
CVE-2014-3122 .../rmap.c 25.0 3 FC
CVE-2014-5471 .../rock.c 31.3 4 FC
TABLE 6
The 4 vulnerabilities detected by VulDeeLocator-BGRU (from 200
program files) that are not reported in the NVD, where |V| is the
number of detected vulnerable lines of source code.
Target
product Vulnerable file
IoU
(%) |V|
Kind of
sSyVC
1st patched
version
Libav
10.3
libavcodec/anonymized.c 33.3 3 PD –
libavcodec/anonymized.c 28.6 2 PD –
libavcodec/anonymized.c 25.0 2 PD –
Libav
9.10 libavformat/matroskadec.c 50.0 3 PD Libav 9.18
Figure 9 presents an example of vulnerability that is
detected by VulDeeLocator-BGRU but missed by VulDeeP-
ecker [17] and SySeVR [18] in software product FFmpeg
0.9.4. This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2011-3934 and
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is related to double free because the statement in Line 11 can
cause a double release of variable “s → current frame”.
Consider sSyVC “s” in Line 3. Since the source code parsing
(e.g. when using Joern [26]) cannot deal with macro defini-
tions, “copy fields(s, s1, golden frame, current frame)”
in Line 11 cannot be identified as “memcpy(&s →
golden frame, &s1 → golden frame, (char∗)&s →
current frame - (char∗)&s → golden frame)”, mean-
ing that the source code-based representation cannot
identify the vulnerable statement in Line 11. This ex-
plains the false-negative of VulDeePecker and SySeVR.
On the other hand, the iSeVC can convert the state-
ment in Line 11 to “memcpy(&s → golden frame,
&s1 → golden frame, (char∗)&s → current frame -
(char∗)&s→ golden frame);”. This explains why VulDee-
Locator can detect the vulnerability.
Table 6 highlights the four vulnerabilities detected by
VulDeeLocator-BGRU that are not reported in the NVD.
These vulnerabilities are caused by improper use of pointers
and allow remote attackers to wage denial-of-service at-
tacks. Specifically, the first vulnerability is caused by the lack
of checking on memory allocation; the second and third ones
are caused by the lack of properly validating the reduction
factor or block length; the fourth one is caused by use-after-
free. Among the four vulnerabilities mentioned above, three
in Libav 10.3 are not known to exist until now and are
confirmed by our manual examination. For ethical exposure
purposes, we anonymize their vulnerable files but have
reported the details to the vendor. The other vulnerability
in Libav 9.10 is a use-after-free vulnerability related to a
pointer named “tracks”; this vulnerability is not reported
in the NVD but has been “silently” patched by the vendor
when releasing newer versions of the product (with the first
patched version being Libav 9.18). In summary, we draw:
Insight 5. VulDeeLocator can detect and pinpoint vulnera-
bilities in real-world software products.
1 static int vp3_update_thread_context(AVCodecContext *dst, const 
   AVCodecContext *src)
2 {
3    Vp3DecodeContext *s = dst->priv_data, *s1 = src->priv_data;
4    ...
5    #define copy_fields(to, from, start_field, end_field) memcpy(&to->start_field,   
      &from->start_field, (char*)&to->end_field - (char*)&to->start_field)
6
7    if (!s1->current_frame.data[0]
8        ||s->width != s1->width
9        ||s->height!= s1->height) {
10        if (s != s1)
11                copy_fields(s, s1, golden_frame, current_frame);
12      return -1;
13   }
14    if (s != s1) {
15        // init tables if the first frame hasn't been decoded
16        if (!s->current_frame.data[0]) {
17          ...
18        }
19       ...
20   #undef copy_fields
21  }
22    update_frames(dst);
23    return 0;
24 }
Fig. 9. The vulnerability detected by VulDeeLocator but not detected by
any of VulDeePecker and SySeVR.
7 LIMITATIONS
This study has several limitations. First, the design of
VulDeeLocator focuses on detecting vulnerabilities in C
source programs because (i) we want to demonstrate the fea-
sibility of VulDeeLocator and (ii) the tools we leverage hap-
pen to support C. Extending VulDeeLocator to accommo-
date other programming languages is an interesting future
work. Second, VulDeeLocator requires to compile program
source code into intermediate code, and cannot be used
when a program source code cannot be compiled. Third,
the four kinds of vulnerability syntax characteristics used
by VulDeeLocator can cover 98.3% of vulnerable programs
collected from NVD and SARD. This 98.3% coverage should
be used with caution because (i) for the NVD data, we only
use the lines of code that are deleted or moved in a diff file as
the location of a vulnerability (i.e., we did not consider those
vulnerabilities whose diff files only involve line additions),
and (ii) the SARD data may not be representative of real-
world software products. It is an open problem to identify
more complete vulnerability syntax characteristics. Fourth,
our case study uses BRNN-vdl to instantiate VulDeeLocator
to demonstrate feasibility. Tailored neural networks need to
be designed for vulnerability detection purposes. Fifth, we
can partly explain the effectiveness of VulDeeLocator, but
much more research needs to be done in this direction of
explainability.
8 RELATED WORK
Prior work on static vulnerability detection. The present
study belongs to static vulnerability detection, which in-
cludes code similarity-based methods and pattern-based meth-
ods. Code similarity-based methods [2], [3], [4], [5] can
achieve a high locating precision when they indeed detect
vulnerabilities, but have a high false-negative rate because
many vulnerabilities are not caused by code cloning [17].
Pattern-based vulnerability detection methods can be fur-
ther divided into rule-based ones and machine learning-based
ones. Rule-based methods use analyst-generated rules to
detect vulnerabilities, including (i) open source tools (e.g.,
Flawfinder [6]) and commercial tools (e.g., Checkmarx [7]),
which operate on program source code, and (ii) Fortify and
Coverity [8], [9], which operate on intermediate code. These
tools have high false-positives or false-negatives [42]. Ma-
chine learning-based methods aim to detect vulnerabilities
using patterns learned from analyst-defined feature repre-
sentations of vulnerabilities [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [24] or
“raw” feature representations via deep learning [19], [20],
[21], [17], [18], [43]. These methods detect vulnerabilities at
coarse granularities (e.g., programs [14], components [13],
functions [12], [19], [21], [43], and code gadgets [17], [18]).
Among the detectors mentioned above, VulDeePecker
[17] and SySeVR [18] are closely related to ours. However,
these two detectors operate on program slices and source
code-based vulnerability candidates. To the best of our
knowledge, VulDeeLocator is the first deep learning-based
detector that uses intermediate code-based vulnerability
candidates to accommodate semantic information and uses
granularity refinement to achieve a high locating precision.
Prior work on dynamic vulnerability detection. Dynamic
vulnerability detection, including dynamic symbolic execu-
tion [44], [45] and fuzzing [46], [47], is complementary to
static vulnerability detection and is often used to detect
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vulnerabilities in binary code. These methods explore pro-
gram execution paths to identify the inputs that make the
program exhibit unsafe operations (e.g., crashing). These
methods can determine whether or not a program has a bug
or vulnerability, but cannot precisely locate the vulnerability.
In contrast, VulDeeLocator not only can detect vulnerabili-
ties but also can pin down the locations of vulnerabilities,
partly owing to the availability of program source code and
intermediate code.
Prior work on bug detection. Since vulnerabilities can be
seen as a special kind of bugs [48], we briefly review prior
studies on bug detectors. Similar to vulnerability detection,
there are two detection methods: static vs. dynamic. Static
methods often use information retrieval techniques together
with bug reports to detect bugs in source code (e.g., [49],
[50]). Dynamic methods include: spectrum-based methods
[51], which examine pass-and-fail execution traces to de-
termine whether or not a line of source code has a bug;
mutation-based methods [52], [53], which consider whether
or not the execution of a line of code affects the result of a
test case. However, bug detection methods cannot be used
to detect vulnerabilities because (i) bugs are not necessarily
vulnerabilities and (ii) bug detection methods often rely on
bug reports or test cases.
9 CONCLUSION
We presented VulDeeLocator, the first deep learning-based
fine-grained vulnerability detector that can simultaneously
achieve a high detection capability and a high locating
precision. It achieves these by leveraging intermediate code
to capture semantic information that cannot be conveyed
by source code-based representations and the new idea of
granularity refinement. As one application, VulDeeLocator
detected four vulnerabilities that were not reported in the
NVD. The limitations of the present study offer interesting
open problems for future research.
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